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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
W. & G. COMPANY, et al., 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
et al., 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Appeal No. 860539 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
LISTING OF ALL PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
All of the parties are listed in the caption of the case. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action filed by several Landowners in Block 57 
of the downtown Salt Lake business district against the 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, et al., wherein said 
Landowners sought and obtained from the District Court an 
Order determining that certain ordinances adopted by the Salt 
Lake City Commission were improper and, as a consequence 
thereof, an injunction was issued enjoining the Redevelopment 
Agency from condemning any of the Plaintiff's properties 
pursuant to the ordinances. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was submitted to the District Court on Motions 
for Summary Judgment filed by both respective parties. The 
District Court denied the Defendants1 Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and the District Court granted the Plain-
tiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court 
determined that the Agency and Salt Lake City had failed to 
comply with the requirements of the Utah Neighborhood Develop-
ment Act, determined that those requirements were jurisdic-
tional in nature, and entered an Order that the Agency may not 
acquire the Plaintiff's Block 57 properties by condemnation or 
by threat thereof. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
ISSUE I 
IS THE LANDOWNERS' ACTION BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS? 
ISSUE II 
IS THE 'NOTICE' OF THE PUBLIC HEARING WHEREIN THE 
ADOPTION OF THE SUBJECT ORDINANCES WAS CONSIDERED SO 
INADEQUATE AS TO DENY THE LANDOWNERS DUE PROCESS AND 
CAUSE THE LEGISLATIVE ACTION TAKEN DURING SAID 
MEETINGS TO BE NULL AND VOID? 
ISSUE III 
IS THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY REQUIRED BY STATUTE TO 
MAKE A PROPERTY-BY-PROPERTY SPECIFIC FINDING OF 
"BLIGHT" OF EACH PARCEL WITHIN A PROJECT AREA? 
ISSUE IV 
WERE THE LANDOWNERS ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY DETERMINA-
TION THAT THE ORDINANCES IN QUESTION WERE ARBITRARY, 
CAPRICIOUS, OR FRAUDULENT IN THEIR NATURE OR FORM? 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants seek an Order reversing the District 
Court's Order granting a partial summary judgment in favor of 
the Landowners and denying the Appellants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1969, the Utah Legislature adopted the Utah Neighbor-
hood Development Act, UTAH CODE ANNO. §11-19-1 et seg. The 
Defendant, Salt Lake City Redevelopment Agency, (hereinafter 
AGENCY) is a duly created agency organized and functioning 
under the provisions of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act. 
The Plaintiffs are seven property owners having separate 
interests in real properties situated in Block 57 of the 
downtown business district of Salt Lake City, Utah (see map of 
the properties, Exhibit 1 to Complaint and Affidavits of 
Plaintiffs D. Krantz, R. Nielson, R. Tannenbaum, J. Trapp and 
E. Wolf, R. 27) 
On February 4, 1971, the AGENCY adopted the "C.B.D. WEST 
NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM" which originally'included a 
project area of approximately 2\ blocks of the downtown Salt 
Lake City business district. (Deposition of M. Chitwood, 
Executive Director of the Redevelopment Agency, page 14) . In 
May of 1975, the AGENCY passed a Resolution to consider the 
adoption of an ordinance amending the Plan to include an 
additional 11 blocks of the downtown Salt Lake City business 
district, including Block 57. (Deposition of M. Chitwood and 
Second Affidavit of M. Chitwood, Exhibit B, R. 758). Accord-
ingly, a Notice of Public Hearing of meetings scheduled before 
the AGENCY to be held on July 31 and August 4, 1975 and before 
the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City on September 3, 
1975, was mailed to each Landowner in the project area and was 
duly published as required by law. (Second Affidavit of M. 
Chitwood, Exhibit C, R. 771-796). 
Subsequent to said meetings, the Salt Lake City Board of 
Commissioners, by Ordinance dated September 10, 1975 adopted 
the C.B.D. NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT PLAN, dated August 6, 1975 
(Second Affidavit of M. Chitwood, Exhibit H, R. 842). A copy 
of the Ordinance and Notice of its Adoption was mailed to each 
Landowner in the project area on September 15, 1975 (Second 
Affidavit of M. Chitwood, Exhibit J, R. 870). No action 
contesting the Ordinance was filed by the Landowners until the 
present matter was filed on February 14, 1985. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I 
IS THE PLAINTIFFS1 ACTION BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS? 
The Landowners below complained of inadequacies within 
19 77 and 1982 Ordinances adopted by the AGENCY relative to 
Block 57. Those Ordinances are the yearly implementation 
plans of the previously described Redevelopment Plan of 1975. 
The actual Plan under which the property in question became a 
part of a redevelopment project occurred in 1975. But even 
under the best possible scenario from the Landowners1 posi-
tion, this matter is clearly barred by the applicable statute 
of limitations. The Utah Legislature knew at the time of the 
enactment of the Redevelopment Act that once the detailed 
process set forth in the Act and discussed hereinafter had 
been followed by the Agency relative to the selection of a 
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"project area", preparation of a "preliminary plan" for 
redevelopment, and "public hearings" and meetings regarding 
the same and the findings of "blight" by the Commission and 
the adoption by "Ordinance" of a "redevelopment plan", that in 
implementing such a plan a city would, of necessity, be 
obligating and committing itself in land acquisition and other 
development activities to substantial expense, exposure, and 
liability. Therefore, to prevent the very type of claim that 
has been filed here - one challenging the validity, suffi-
ciency, and adequacy of ordinances adopted ten years prior to 
filing of the lawsuit and after years of development activity 
had occurred under the Redevelopment Plan, the Legislature 
provided, by statute of limitation, that all such claims, 
including those raised by the Landowners in this matter, are 
jbarred unless raised and asserted within 30 days* from 
publication of the Ordinance finding "blight" and adopting a 
"redevelopment plan". 
" . . . for a period of 30 days after publication of 
the Ordinance adopting the redevelopment plan, any 
person in interest may contest the regularity, 
formality, or legality of the Ordinance. After the 
30 day period, no person may contest the regularity, 
formality or legality of the Ordinance for any cause 
whatsoever. (UTAH CODE ANNO. §11-19-20. Emphasis 
added) 
Because this case was not filed within the prescribed 
time period for asserting said claims, the Complaint challeng-
* This Statute was enlarged to 60 days by amendment 
effective June 1983, but in 1975, 1977 and 1982, the 
30 day provision was applicable. 
ing the sufficiency of the findings of "blight" within the 
Ordinances and the request of the District Court to invalidate 
such findings and Ordinances should have been dismissed 
summarily. 
One cannot avoid a statute of limitations bar by assert-
ing the claim as one for a Declaratory Judgment, as was done 
in this case, and the Courts have uniformly held that where 
the statute of limitations would bar a suit directly on the 
merits, the statute of limitations would bar a Declaratory 
Judgment as well. Normally the statute of limitations does 
not start to run in matters where a Declaratory Judgment is 
sought until the "controversy" occurs. 
Since no cause for Declaratory Relief accrues until 
there is an actual controversy, the Statue of 
Limitations does not begin to run until such 
controversy occurs." (22 Am Jur 2d "DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENTS" §78 Page 941) 
But in cases where legislation provides for a timely 
filing of a direct challenge as to the validity of the 
Ordinance, the statute of limitation commences to run at the 
adoption of the Ordinance. 
"Where a special Statute of Limitations applies to a 
Special Statutory Proceeding, it will be applied 
when a Declaratory Judgment is sought to achieve the 
same result as the Special Proceeding." (22 Am Jur 
2d "DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS" §78 Page 940-41) 
In Campbell v. Nassau County, et al.. 273 App. Div. 785 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947) the New York Supreme Court held, in an 
action which sought to declare void certain resolutions and an 
Ordinance made and passed by Nassau County, that since the 
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Plaintiff did not file his Verified Complaint until 18 months 
after the Ordinance was adopted while the Civil Practice Act 
required such contest to be made " . . . within 30 days from 
the date of the adoption of the Ordinance . . . /'an action 
in equity for a Declaratory Judgment could not be maintained. 
In Sweetwater Valley Clinic Association v. National City, 
et al.. 133 Cal.Rptr. 859, 555 P. 2d 1099 (Cal. 1976) the 
National City Redevelopment Agency declared certain lands 
"blighted" under a California Act basically similar to the 
Utah Neighborhood Development Act. In the California Act, a 
similar statute of limitation provision is set forth, and the 
Court, after setting forth the definition therein contained, 
held: 
". . .no Action attacking or otherwise questioning 
the validity of . any of the findings or 
determinations of the Agency or legislative body . . 
. shall be brought . . . after the elapse of 60 days 
from and after the date of adoption of the Ordinance 
adopting the plan. The negative implication of the 
Statute of Limitation provision is that judicial 
review of the findings is available when sought 
within the 60 day period." (555 P.2d at 1102-03) 
This Court has noted the significance of such timely 
filings and challenges to Redevelopment Ordinances. In Salt 
Lake County v. Murray Redevelopment Agency, 598 P. 2d 1339 
(Utah 1979), this Court allowed a successful challenge to a 
Redevelopment Agency's Ordinance, but made specific notation 
in the factual recital of the case that the matter had been 
timely filed. 
"Plaintiffs did not appear at the hearing or file 
written objections to the plan, but on October 8, 
1976, it filed a Complaint in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County challenging the constitutionality 
of the Act and charging that the plan and the 
Ordinance adopting it are not in conformity with the 
Act." (598 P.2d at 1344. Emphasis added. The 
Ordinance was enacted on September 8, 1976 and 
published thereafter.) 
Because this matter was not filed within the prescribed 
and allowed period it should have been summarily dismissed and 
the Trial Court erred in not doing so. 
ISSUE II 
IS THE 'NOTICE1 OF THE PUBLIC HEARING WHEREIN THE 
ADOPTION OF THE SUBJECT ORDINANCES WAS CONSIDERED SO 
INADEQUATE AS TO DENY THE LANDOWNERS DUE PROCESS AND 
CAUSE THE LEGISLATIVE ACTION TAKEN DURING SAID 
MEETINGS TO BE NULL AND VOID? 
The Landowners' argument is that the Notice of a Public 
Hearing prescribed by the UTAH CODE ANNO. §11-19-16 was 
inadequate, ambiguous or misleading. In support of that 
position, they attached a copy of the "Notice" they challenged 
as well as a copy of a letter of transmittal of that Notice, 
both dated in May of 1982. The fallacy of such a position is 
that the pubic meetings in 1982. are not the public meetings at 
which a legislative finding was made that the subject proper-
ties were located in a "blighted area". After taking the 
deposition of the executive director of the AGENCY on October 
9, 1985, that fact, i.e., that the 1982 public meeting was not 
the meeting in which the subject Ordinance being challenged 
was passed, was known, unmistakably, by the Landowners herein. 
(See Chitwood Deposition pages 13-14). Yet, notwithstanding 
the Landowners' knowledge and understanding of that historical 
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fact, they nevertheless persist in arguing and, indeed, 
exclusively directing their challenges in the District Court 
toward the 1982 public meetings, which is merely an annual 
implementation proposal of a previously (1975) adopted Plan. 
By such action the Landowners' attempt to diffuse the anti-
quity and untimeliness of this action by reducing the gap 
between the Ordinance and their filing a "declaratory judg-
ment" regarding the same. 
The content of the required Notice has been specifically 
prescribed by statute: 
"(1) Notice of the public hearing on a project area 
redevelopment plan shall be given by publication not 
less than once a week for four successive weeks in a 
newspaper of general circulation published in the 
county in which the land lies. The notice shall: 
(a) Describe specifically the boundaries 
of the proposed redevelopment project 
area; and 
(b) State the day, hour and place in which 
persons objecting to the proposed project 
area redevelopment plan or denying the 
existence of blight in the proposed 
project area or denying the regularity of 
any of the proceedings, may appear before 
the legislative body and show cause why 
the proposed plan should not be adopted." 
(UTAH CODE ANNO. §11-19-16.) 
The actual notice of the 1975 public meetings followed 
precisely, the statutory requirements and, in pertinent part, 
verJbatijn, the language the legislature mandated. After giving 
the full legal description of the properties affected by and 
included within the proposed project area, the notice pro-
vided: 
"Persons having objections to the proposed redeve-
lopment plan or who deny the existence of blight in 
the proposed project area, or the regularity of 
prior proceedings, may appear at the hearing or may 
file written objections prior to the hearing with 
the Salt Lake City Recorder showing cause why the 
proposed plan should not be adopted. 
A copy of the proposed redevelopment plan with 
amendments and modifications is on file for public 
inspection in the office of the Salt Lake City 
Planning Department, Room 414, City and County 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah." (R. 772) 
The proposed redevelopment plan referred to in the 
written notice was kept on file and open to the public for 
inspection for 10 days prior to the first public meeting (see 
Second Affidavit M. Chitwood, Exhibit D, minutes of the Agency 
meeting, paragraph 6, R. 798). 
In that Plan, a "Statement of Development Objectives" 
provides as follows: 
"B. Statement of Development Objectives 
a. Removal of structurally substandard 
buildings to permit the return of the 
project area land to economic use and new 
construction. 
b. Removal of impediments to land disposition 
and development through assembly of land 
into reasonably sized and shaped parcels 
served by improved public utilities and 
new community facilities. 
c. Rehabilitation of buildings to assure 
sound long term economic activity in the 
core area of the City." (R. 761) 
It further provides how those objectives would be 
achieved: 
"D. Techniques to Achieve Plan Objectives 
Activities contemplated in carrying out the 
program in the Area include the acquisition, 
clearance and redevelopment of those properties 
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shown in the Clearance and Redevelopment Area 
on the Clearance and Redevelopment Map, 
included as an exhibit and made a part of this 
Plan, and the rehabilitation of other proper-
ties in the renewal area as shown on the 
Clearance and Redevelopment Map." (R. 764) 
No plans were made for "acquisition and clearance" in the 
expanded area (which included Block 57) "during the first year 
of the plan" but it is inconceivable that as a result of the 
adoption of said Plan a property owner within the boundaries 
of the project area would not comprehend and understand that 
an ordinance adopting the 1975 C. B. D. Neighborhood Develop-
ment Plan may subject his property, in subsequent years, to 
acquisition and clearance for redevelopment purposes. 
It is respectfully submitted that by giving the statutor-
ily mandated notice, verbatim, and by fully advising the 
public within the text of the proposed Plan of the ultimate 
objective of acquisition of properties located within the 
"project area", constitutionally mandated due process was 
afforded each Landowner. Attestation of the reasonableness or 
effectiveness of the "notice" can be found in the fact that 
public attendance at the noticed meetings and their participa-
tion, input, hue and cry both for and against the adoption of 
an amendment to the Plan was substantial! (See Minutes of 
Meetings, R. 797-815; 816-840.) 
ISSUE III 
IS THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY REQUIRED BY STATUTE TO 
MAKE A PROPERTY-BY-PROPERTY SPECIFIC FINDING OF 
"BLIGHT" OF EACH PARCEL WITHIN A PROJECT AREA? 
The gravamen of this Declaratory Action is the validity 
of the "area" concept in the determination of "blight". 
Succinctly stated, the Landowners argue that the Utah Neigh-
borhood Development Act requires a property-by-property, lot-
by-lot, parcel-by-parcel, and, projected to the absurd, a 
room-by-room* evaluation of property or buildings to be 
included within a project "area" and a specific finding that 
each and every property, lot, parcel, building, or room 
thereof is "in fact" blighted. 
It is conceded that no such individual "blight" analysis 
was undertaken by the AGENCY. The AGENCY focused on the issue 
of "blight" on an "area" basis, looking at the overall 
condition of a limited geographic area which included parcels 
in varying stages of deterioration or repair. The Landowners 
do not maintain that the "area" is not blighted, only that the 
AGENCY did not specifically and separately find their indivi-
dual buildings to be "blighted". A careful scrutiny of the 
Utah Neighborhood Development Act clearly indicates that the 
legislature intended that Redevelopment Agencies consider the 
* While ostensibly this statement may appear as 
argumentum ad horrendum, the fact is that within 
Block 57 are office structures which have been 
converted to individual office condominiums, each of 
which, under the Landowner interpretation of the 
Act, require a specific finding of blight, literally 
"room-by-room". 
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existence of "blight" on an "area" basis-not an individual 
building basis or on an individual component or room-by-room 
basis as argued by the Landowners. In the definitional 
portion of the Act, the following provisions appear. 
"(8) 'Redevelopment1 means the planning, develop-
ment , replanning, redesign, clearance, reconstruc-
tion, or rehabilitation, or any combination of 
these, of all or part of a project area, and the 
provisions of such residential, commercial, indus-
trial, public, or other structures or spaces as may 
be appropriate or necessary in the interest of the 
general welfare, including recreational and other 
facilities incidental or appurtenant to them. 
Redevelopment includes: 
(a) The alteration, improvement, moderniza-
tion, reconstruction, or rehabilitation, or any 
combination of these, of existing structures in a 
project area; 
(b) Provision for open space types of use, 
such as streets and other public grounds and space 
around buildings, and public or private buildings, 
structures and improvements, and improvements of 
public or private recreation areas and other public 
grounds; 
(c) The replanning or redesign or original 
development of undeveloped areas as to which either 
of the following conditions exist: 
(i) The areas are stagnant or improperly 
utilized because of defective or inadequate street 
layout, faulty lot layout in relation to size, 
shape, accessibility, or usefulness, or for other 
causes; or 
(ii) The areas require replanning and land 
assembly for reclamation or development in the 
interest of the general welfare. 
Redevelopment shall include and encourage the 
continuance of existing buildings or uses whose 
demolition and rebuilding or change of use are not 
deemed essential to the development, redevelopment 
or rehabilitation of the area.%% UTAH CODE ANNO. 
§11-19-21 (emphasis added). 
In describing "blight" the statute consistently refers 
exclusively to "area" or "areas" and not individual parcels. 
"(9) A 'blighted area' is an area used or 
intended to be used for residential, commercial, 
industrial, or other purposes or any combination of 
such uses which is characterized by two or more of 
the following factors: 
* * * 
(10) 'Project area' means an area of a com-
munity which is a blighted area within a designated 
redevelopment survey area, the redevelopment of 
which is necessary to effectuate the public purposes 
declared in this chapter and which is selected by 
the redevelopment agency pursuant to this chapter. 
(11) 'Redevelopment survey area' means an area 
of a community designated by resolution of the 
legislative body or the governing body of the agency 
for study by the agency to determine if a redevelop-
ment project or projects within the area are 
feasible. 
(12) 'Redevelopment plan' means a plan deve-
loped by the agency and adopted by ordinance of the 
governing body of a community to guide and control 
redevelopment undertakings in a specific redevelop-
ment project area." UTAH CODE ANNO. §11-19-21 (9), 
(10), (11), (12), (emphasis added). 
The legislature expressly provided that a "blighted area" 
is one which is "characterized by" certain factors which 
evidenced blight and not, as Plaintiffs would argue, are 
restricted to certain types of buildings. 
Moreover, the required findings by the legislative body 
to become part of the ordinance are not required to be parcel-
by-parcel but, by statute, are designated to be on an "area" 
basis. 
"(5) The findings and determinations of the 
legislative body based upon fact that: 
(a) The project area is a blighted area, the 
redevelopment of which is necessary to effectuate 
the public purposes declared in this act." UTAH 
CODE ANNO. §11-19-21. 
There is not one single usage of the word "blight" in the 
Utah Neighborhood Development Act which is not modified by 
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"area" within the same sentence. That is not just coinciden-
tal, but is consistent with the entire concept of urban 
renewal, which, by its very nature requires the dealing with 
properties and parcels as a "group" or "area" and not indivi-
dually. 
Challenges to the "area" concept of finding and dealing 
with "blight" by redevelopment are not new, but they have been 
consistently rejected as antithetical to the concept of urban 
renewal. 
It must be borne in mind that the determination of the 
existence of "blight" and the desirability of redevelopment 
are "political" and "public policy" questions which are 
reserved by and repose exclusively with the legislative body. 
Therefore, the public hearings attendant the adoption of the 
Redevelopment Project Plans are not "trial-type hearings" but 
are merely legislatively created public hearings which are 
restricted in scope and formality specifically by the statute 
under which they are proscribed: 
"It seems plain that so far as the investigation of 
the matter of blight is concerned, the demands of 
due process did not call for a hearing at all. 
David Jeffrey Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 267 Wis. 
559, 66 N.W.2d 362, 380 (Sup.Ct.1954); Robinette v. 
Chicago Land Clearance Commission, 115 F.Supp. 669, 
672 (D.C.I11. 1951). That determination might 
constitutionally have been left for ex parte action 
by the governing body or the planning board. Of 
course, the Legislature in its discretion may, as 
was done here, lay down a mandate for a particular 
type of hearing. In this event/ the procedure must 
be followed. But having in mind the nature of the 
public use involved and the fact that ordinarily the 
subject matter of the hearing is within the legisla-
tive domain, the language employed should be 
scrutinized carefully to determine if the lawmakers 
intended to yield the normal prerogative and 
function of their branch of the government. 
The argument that a trial type hearing was 
intended is predicated largely upon the direction, 
in section 6, supra, that among other factors, the 
board f shall consider * * * any evidence which may 
be adduced in support of the objections, * *.f The 
idea is that the word 'evidence1 connotes proof 
conforming to the rules of evidence applicable to a 
judicial proceeding and submitted through the avenue 
of direct and cross examination in the formal 
setting of a trial type hearing. But a doctrinaire 
formalism cannot be applied in the consideration of 
a problem like this. The legislative intent can 
only be gathered by a study of the entire enactment. 
The significance of the word 'evidence1 must then be 
drawn from its position and association in the 
framework fashioned by the makers. 
As has been shown above, investigation or study of 
the desirability of acquiring private property for 
public use, as well as the decision to take, are 
preliminary matters which have always been regarded 
as legislative in character and not subject to the 
hearing requirements of due process. If this were 
not so, government could not function effectively. 
We must assume that the Legislature, in adopting the 
Blighted Area Act, knew the state of the law and the 
difference between a legislative and a judicial 
hearing. No sound argument can be made that, when 
the Legislature in writing the section directed the 
planning board to consider 'any, and all, written 
objections that may be filed,' it intended to limit 
the proof to facts admissible under the rules of 
evidence. The very words 'any, and all,' clearly 
point away from such a conclusion. The mandate to 
consider such objections is followed immediately by 
the crucial language 'and [shall consider] any 
evidence which may be adduced * * *.' In context, 
it would be inconsistent and illogical to say that 
this clause contemplates a judicial hearing. The 
embracive word 'any' before 'evidence' 'manifests a 
design to permit the introduction of any factual 
data or argument which an objector feels bears upon 
his position and the question to be reported upon by 
the board. The purpose is to give objecting 
property owners unlimited and unhampered scope in 
the presentation of material which they deem to be 
in support of their opposition. The language fairly 
breathes such an objective. Note that the board is 
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ordered to consider any and all written 'objections' 
and fany evidence which may be adduced in support of 
the objections* ' 
The imposition of a duty on a legislative agency 
to receive and consider evidence in connection with 
a hearing provided for in a statute, does not per se 
signify that the hearing is to be of the trial 
type." 
Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 142 A.2d 837, 
851-52 (1958) is one which is "characterized by" certain 
factors which evidenced blight and not, as Plaintiffs 
would argue, are restricted to certain types of build-
ings. 
Moreover, the required findings by the legislative body 
to become part of the ordinance are not required to be parcel-
by-parcel but, by statute, are designated to be on an "area" 
basis. 
"(5) The findings and determinations of the 
legislative body based upon fact that: 
(a) The project area is a blighted area, the 
redevelopment of which is necessary to effectuate 
the public purposes declared in this act." UTAH 
CODE ANNO. §11-19-21. 
A. Scope of Judicial Review of "Blight" 
It is important to note at the outset, concerning the 
issue of the existence or nonexistence of "blight", the Courts 
have consistently determined that such questions are "politi-
cal" and "public policy" matters which are the exclusive and 
sole province of the legislature. The Court's inquiry is 
restricted to whether or not the legislature was "guilty of 
bad faith or arbitrary or capricious action", and not to 
review whether, in the Courtfs opinion, the area is in fact 
"blighted". (See Girubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency of City of 
Tampa, 115 So. 2d 274, 748 (1959). 
"It has been the uniform holding of these courts 
that the designation of the area to be taken for the 
renewal project is a legislative function, political 
in nature, and that the function of the court is 
limited to ascertaining whether or not the function 
has been exercised in a legal manner and that there 
has been no fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious 
action." R. B. Davis et al., Appellants, v. City 
of Lubbock, 326 S.W.2d 699, 712 (Tex. 1959). 
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 In passing both the Blighting Ordinance and the 
Development Ordinance, the Board of Aldermen acted 
in its legislative capacity. We are bound by the 
ligatures of review to a determination of whether 
the action was arbitrary, the result of fraud, 
collusion, or bad faith, or whether the City 
exceeded its power. The issue of whether a legisla-
tive determination of blight is arbitrary turns upon 
the facts of each case. And, the burden of proving 
that it is arbitrary is on the party so charging." 
Maryland Plaza Development v. Greenberg, 594 S.W.2d 
284, 287 (Mo. App. 1979) (citations omitted). 
The landmark case involving the question and validity of 
the area blight concept is the decision by Justice Douglas in 
Berman v. Parker, 346 U.S. 26, 75 S. Ct. 98, 99 L. Ed. 27 
(1954) wherein the Court held: 
"In the present case, Congress and its authorized 
agencies attack the problem of the blighted parts of 
the community on an area rather than on a structure-
by-structure basis. That, too, is opposed by 
appellants. They maintain that since their building 
does not imperil health or safety nor contribute to 
the making of a slum or a blighted area, it cannot 
be swept into a redevelopment plan by the mere 
dictum of the Planning Commission or the Commis-
sioners. The particular uses to be made of the land 
in the project were determined with regard to the 
needs of the particular community. The experts 
concluded that if the community were to be healthy, 
if it were not to revert again to a blighted or slum 
area, as though possessed of a congenital disease, 
the area must be planned as a whole. It was not 
enough, they believed, to remove existing buildings 
that were insanitary or unsightly. It was important 
to redesign the whole area so as to eliminate the 
conditions that cause slums - the overcrowding of 
dwellings, the lack of parks, the lack of adequate 
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streets and alleys, the absence of recreational 
areas, the lack of light and air, the presence of 
outmoded street patterns. It was believed that the 
piecemeal approach, the removal of individual 
structures that were offensive, would be only a 
palliative. The entire area needed redesigning so 
that a balanced, integrated plan could be developed 
for the region, including not only new homes but 
also schools, churches, parks, streets, and shopping 
centers. In this way it was hoped that the cycle of 
decay of the area could be controlled and the birth 
of future slums prevented. * * * Such diversifica-
tion in future use is plainly relevant to the 
maintenance of the desired housing standards and 
therefore within congressional power. 
* * * Property may of course be taken for this 
redevelopment which, standing by itself, is inno-
cuous and unoffending. But we have said enough to 
indicate that it is the need of the area as a whole 
which Congress and its agencies are evaluating. If 
owner after owner were permitted to resist these 
redevelopment programs on the ground that his 
particular property was not being used against the 
public interest, integrated plans for redevelopment 
would suffer greatly. The argument pressed on us 
is, indeed, a plea to substitute the landowner's 
standard of the public need for the standard 
prescribed by Congress. But as we have already 
stated, community redevelopment programs need not, 
by force of the Constitution, be on a piecemeal 
basis - lot by lot, building by building. 
It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of 
the boundary line nor to sit in review on the size 
of a particular project area. Once the question of 
the public purpose has been decided, the amount and 
character of land to be taken for the project and 
the need for a particular tract to complete the 
integrated plan rests in the discretion of the 
legislative branch." 346 U.S. at 34-36. 
Berman has been cited and followed universally by every 
Court which has considered the "area" vs. "parcel-by-parcel" 
issue. In Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 142 A.2d 837, (N.J. 
1958) the Court cited the Berman text above and held: 
"Denial of the right of the municipality to draw 
within a blighted area certain houses or buildings 
which are in good condition, would be in some 
instances to defeat the overall legislative purpose, 
namely, the redevelopment of blighted areas." 
142 A.2d at 849. 
See also the following cases: 
"If the Project plan, as a whole, is valid, then the 
inclusion therein of sound structures or vacant land 
does not necessarily invalidate the Project. This 
is so because the purpose of the Urban Renewal Law 
is to transform an entire slum area into a wholesome 
section of the community; and to deny to the city 
the right to include within the area certain houses 
or buildings in good condition would, in some 
instances, defeat the over-all purpose of the 
statute and the Project. Thus, it is universally 
held that if an area as a whole is subject to 
clearance and rehabilitation, the condition of a 
single structure located therein is immaterial." 
Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency of City of Tampa, 
115 So.2d 745, 748 (1958). 
"Plaintiff's property is a sound and safe structure. 
It is to be taken by the Authority only because it 
is within the slum area as defined in the plan. 
Plaintiff accordingly argues that even if the 
Authority may condemn and raze sub-standard struc-
tures, it may not lawfully take and destroy a 
building that is neither sub-standard nor unsani-
tary. 
This argument overlooks the fact that in condemn-
ing property to eliminate a slum the act requires 
the Authority to deal with an area, not with 
separate individual buildings. The test of the 
existence of a slum is the substantial preponderance 
of unsafe and unsanitary structures in the area. 
That the application of this test bears hardly upon 
an owner of sound property is undoubtedly true; but 
hardship may always exist when the power of eminent 
domain is exercised. The legislature has determined 
that the feasible method of accomplishing slum 
clearance is by clearing an area; and we cannot say 
that such a determination is manifestly unreason-
able." Randolph v. Wilmington Housing Authority, 
139 A.2d 476, 484 (Dela. 1958)." 
V. May a standard building within a slum area be 
taken for the project? 
Appellant Johnson takes the position that, in any 
event, his property may not be taken because the 
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structure located upon his property is standard and 
meets the minimum requirements of the City's 
building code. 
[9] The answer to the contention, according to 
the uniform holdings of the highest courts of other 
states and of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, is that in condemning property to eliminate 
a slum, the act requires the city to deal with an 
area, not with separate individual holdings. One of 
the major tests of the existence of a slum is the 
substantial preponderance of unsafe and unsanitary 
structures in the area. The Legislature has 
determined that the feasible method of accomplishing 
slum clearance is by clearing an area, and we cannot 
say that such a determination is manifestly unrea-
sonable. 
The extensive annotation in the American Law 
Reports, reviewing the many cases on this point, 
states: 
'One point which does appear to be firmly 
established * * *is that under the 
statutory 'area concept,f whereby whole 
areas are selected for redevelopment, the 
statute will not be invalidated, nor will 
the particular projects be held illegal, 
because some properties within the farea' 
are by no means substandard or blighted.' 
The principle was recognized by this Court in the 
Dallas Housing Authority case where it was said: 
'When the use is public, the necessity or 
expediency of appropriating any particular 
property is not a subject of judicial 
cognizance.'" 
R. B. Davis v. City of Lubbock, 326 S.W.2d 699, 710-
11 (Tex. 1959). 
" It is to be noted that the plaintiff Velishka's 
property is not blighted property and it is urged 
that the act thereby allows the power of eminent 
domain to be employed for uses inconsistent with the 
purposes of the act. The intent of the act was to 
acquire and prevent recurrence of 'blighted areas.' 
Experience has shown and the facts of this case 
indicate that the area must be treated as a unit and 
that a particular building either within or near the 
blighted area may have to be included to accomplish 
the purposes of the act. It is not necessary that 
every building in such an area be in a blighted 
condition before the whole area may be condemned. 
It is sufficient that the taking as a whole is 
reasonably necessary to the clearance of blighted 
areas and prevention of their recurrence." Miller 
v. City of Tacoma, 378 P.2d 464, 475 (Wash. 1963). 
B. Effective*s11-19-9 on the "Area" Concept of Redevelopment 
The Utah Neighborhood Development Act provides as 
follows: 
"A project area must be restricted to buildings, 
improvements, or lands which are detrimental or 
inimical to the public health, safety, or welfare." 
(§11-19-9). 
The Landowners argue that the inclusion within the Act of 
Section 9 requires the AGENCY to find "blight" on an indivi-
dual property basis and is legislative abandonment or repudia-
tion of the "area" concepts heretofore discussed. Said 
argument fails for two reasons: 
1. To construe §11-19-9 as an abandonment of the "area" 
concept of blight and redevelopment is diametrically contrary 
to every other statutory reference to "blight" and "redevelop-
ment" in the Act; and, 
2. §11-19-9 does not address the issue of "blight" but 
is far less restrictive. 
This Court, in interpreting and construing the Utah 
Neighborhood Development Act must do so liberally so as to 
affect the objects and purpose of the statute: 
"The rule of the common law that statutes in 
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has 
no application to the statutes of the state. The 
statutes establish the laws of this state respecting 
the subjects to which they relate, and their 
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provisions and all proceedings under them are to be 
liberally construed with a view to affect the 
objects of the statutes and to promote justice." 
(UTAH CODE ANNO. §68-3-2). 
See also Stanford Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 
184, 341 p.2d 207 (1959). 
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 It may be noted from the above that the legis-
lative purpose in enacting the related 1949 statutes 
was not solely to provide for slum clearance. It 
was to authorize the public agencies to function for 
slum clearance and urban, suburban and rural 
redevelopment, to acquire land for that purpose and 
to make it available for redevelopment by private 
enterprise or by public agencies in accordance with 
approved redevelopment plans. Another purpose was 
to authorize cooperation with and the obtaining of 
funds from federal agencies. Obviously these 
enactments are in pari materia and warrant liberal 
judicial construction in order to effectuate the 
beneficent legislative design." 57 N.J. 506, 274 
A.2d 1, 4 (1971). 
Since every single reference to "redevelopment" and 
"blight" within the Act is couched in terms of "area", it is 
clear that the legislature recognized the principles of Berman 
and the decisions which followed that case, i.e., that 
Redevelopment can only be accomplished by dealing with the 
problem of its existence and the treatment of the problem on 
an "area" concept. Moreover, examination of Section 9 reveals 
that the word "blight" does not appear within said Section, 
even though the Landowners argue that that's what the legisla-
ture meant to say. It is submitted that if the legislature 
had intended to provide, as the Landowners argue, that 
ffblight" must exist in every single piece or foot of property 
included within a redevelopment project area, then Section 9 
should have read as follows: 
"A project area must be restricted to buildings, 
improvements, or lands which are blighted." 
However, the legislature did not use the word "blight" at 
all in Section 9, but, instead, used a far less restrictive 
definition by requiring that the property not be within the 
project area unless it was " . . . detrimental or inimicable 
to the public health, safety, or welfare." 
Consistently the Landowners below argued and convinced 
the District Court that the Act required a specific "blight" 
finding as to each property; but the Act makes no such 
provision. The "area" must be "blighted" and the area must 
include buildings or property which, if not included, would be 
detrimental or inimicable to the health, safety, or "welfare". 
What is in the public's "welfare" is far less restrictive than 
the necessity to find property "blighted". See, Berman v. 
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 99 L.Ed. 27, 75 S.Ct. 98 (1954). 
The Landowners interpretation that each and every 
property or building within a project area must be found to be 
blighted is also blatantly contradictory with the definition 
of an indicia of "blight" as provided within the Act: 
"(9) A 'blighted' area is an area used or 
intended to be used for residential, commercial, 
industrial, or other purposes or any combination of 
such uses which is characterized by two or more of 
the following factors: 
(a) Defective design and character of physical 
construction, 
(b) Faulty interior arrangement and exterior 
spacing, 
(c) High density of population and overcrowd-
ing, 
(d) inadequate provision for ventilation, 
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light, sanitation, open spaces, and recreation 
facilities, 
(e) Age, obsolescence, deterioration, dilapi-
dation, mixed character, or shifting of uses. 
(f) Economic dislocation, deterioration, or 
disuse, resulting from faulty planning, 
(g) Subdividing and sale of lots of irregular 
form and shape and inadequate size for proper 
usefulness and development, 
(h) Laying out of lots in disregard of the 
contours and other physical characteristics of the 
ground and surrounding conditions, 
(i) Existence of inadequate streets, open 
spaces, and utilities, and 
(j) Existence of lots or other areas which are 
subject to being submerged by water." 
UTAH CODE ANNO. §11-19-2(9)(a)-(j). 
An "area" that has two or more of the above "character-
istics" is, by definition, "blighted". Only subsections (a), 
(b) , (d) , (e) , and (f) refer or describe conditions which 
customarily exist or are attendant older buildings. Condi-
tions described in subsections (c) , (g) , (h) , (i) or (j) 
indicate factors which have nothing to do with the physical 
condition of any individual building or property. Hypothe-
tically, a brand new building could be within a "blighted" 
area because it is surrounded or serviced by "inadequate 
streets, open spaces, and utilities", (subsection (i)), and is 
"laid out on a lot of irregular form and shape", (subsection 
(h)). 
ISSUE IV 
WERE THE LANDOWNERS ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY DETERMINA-
TION THAT THE ORDINANCES IN QUESTION WERE ARBITRARY, 
CAPRICIOUS, OR FRAUDULENT IN THEIR NATURE OR FORM? 
Under the restricted review powers of the District Court 
to review and pass upon the finding of "blight" (see Scope of 
Judicial Review herein), it is clear that the finding of 
"blight" by the Salt Lake City Commission in 1975 was amply 
supported by competent evidence and was, therefore, neither 
arbitrary nor capricious in any manner. 
The evidence in this case is that in April, 1975, the 
planning department of Salt Lake City conducted a building by 
building survey of all of the properties located within the 
proposed project area. Those findings were summarized in a 
Report to the C. B. D. Neighborhood Development Plan which was 
presented at the public hearings in 1975 wherein the question 
as to the adoption of the subject project area was considered. 
Examination of that report indicates that there was substan-
tial evidence on which a finding that the area was blighted 
could reasonably have been made by the legislative body: 
" Physical: In April, 1975, the Planning 
Department conducted an external condition survey of 
the expanded NDP downtown area. The survey measured 
conditions for buildings and street improvements 
including sidewalks, curb and gutters, street, 
alleys, etc. In addition, lots without structures 
were identified by use. 
Each building was evaluated in terms of its 
foundation, exterior walls, windows, doors, stair-
ways, and trim features. Using these measurement 
categories each building was categorized into one of 
four condition classes: satisfactory, minor repair 
required, major repair required, and beyond repair. 
A building established upon a foundation which 
is settled or is deflected or is bulging to an 
extent where it has a severe negative impact on the 
exterior walls above it was considered to be 
economically beyond repair. Five percent of the 
buildings in the expanded NDP area (12 buildings) 
were identified as having this condition. 
An exterior wall which is bulging or is out of 
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plumb also causes the building involved to be deemed 
economically beyond repair. 
A building which has a foundation with severe 
erosion, holes, or cracks or an exterior wall with 
cracked, rotted, or worn bricks or severe water 
stains was scheduled for rehabilitation. Broken 
windows, sashes, or sashes out of square or missing; 
doors with frames broken or missing also were 
elements noted which show a need for rehabilitation. 
In total, 94 buildings or 43% of the NDP structures 
were identified as requiring rehabilitation. 
The remaining 99 target area buildings were 
identified as either satisfactory or as needing 
minor repair. Forty-six of these need minor repair 
while 53 are satisfactory according to our study. 
Minor repair is defined as painting, pointing, 
patching, etc., needed for foundations or exterior 
walls; painting, repairing or glazing windows; 
painting or repairing doors; painting, repairing or 
replacing exterior stairways; and painting, repair-
ing or replacing building trim features. 
In addition to the 22 buildings identified and 
classified, there were 19 lots without structures. 
All 19 are parking lots. Thirteen are hardsurfaced 
while the remaining 6 are not. 
Street improvement conditions were noted for 
each property location. For 19 properties the 
sidewalk condition was shown to have drainage 
problems. In 69 cases the sidewalk was identified 
as broken, missing or uneven. In 45 of the property 
areas the sidewalk was noted to have cracks. 
Seventy-five cases were noted to be in good condi-
tion. 
Poor drainage was noted to be the problem for 
19 sections of curb and gutter development. Broken, 
missing or uneven places were identified for 28 
more. Eighty-three curb and gutter sections were 
judged to have minor problems while 67 were judged 
to be in good shape. 
Street problems were noted for 9 percent of the 
entries. Nine entries or 4 percent were noted to be 
high crown streets. Eleven entries or 5 percent 
were shown to be in a broken or uneven condition. 
One hundred and twenty-eight street entries noted 
minor cracks. The remaining 61 were deemed to be 
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high crown streets. Eleven entries or 5 percent 
were shown to be in a broken or uneven condition. 
One hundred and twenty-eight street entries noted 
minor cracks. The remaining 61 were deemed to be 
satisfactory. (Second Affidavit of Michael Chit-
wood, Exhibit H, Pages 1 and 2 R. 853-54). 
In addition, an economic evaluation was made concerning 
the proposed redevelopment area and examination of the report 
further concludes that the legislative body considered those 
factors: 
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 Economic: The economic analysis of the Urban 
Renewal Plan is based upon the basic data found in 
two economic studies. These studies are: "Final 
Report, Economic and Market Analysis, Central 
Business District West, Neighborhood Development 
Program" prepared by Development Research Associ-
ates, 1972; and This is a Community? Salt Lake 
City, 1971 prepared by Claron E. Nelson, Ph.D., 
Department of Economics, University of Utah." 
(Second Affidavit of Michael Chitwood, Exhibit H, 
Page 3, R. 855). 
The finding of "blight" in the project area is a legisla-
tive finding, based upon facts and evidence considered by the 
legislative body. Having made that determination, it is not 
the prerogative of the Court to pass judgment on the wisdom or 
validity of such findings. (See Davis, Maryland, Plaza 
Development and Berman, supra). 
CONCLUSION 
A challenge of the Ordinance declaring the subject 
property blighted is barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations. The Notice to Landowners of the public meetings 
wherein blight was presented was sufficient and cannot be held 
as a matter of law to be so inadequate as to constitute a 
denial of due process. The Agency is not required by statute 
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to make a property by property specific finding of blight of 
each parcel within the project area, but is required merely to 
include only those buildings which are detrimental, inimicable 
or harmful to the public health, safety and welfare. The 
Landowners did not establish facts sufficient to allow the 
Court to enter a summary determination that the Ordinances in 
question were arbitrary, capricious, or fraudulent in their 
nature or form. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted, 
&. 
Harold A. Hintze 
Attorney for Defendants 
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